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Introduction
Legal ethics is largely concerned with questions of moral permissibility. Is a lawyer morally permitted, for example, to destroy
the character o1 an innocent witness througn rubI'iu.ss cross-examination or to withhold information, unknown to the authorities, regarding his client's participation in past crimes? A lawyer has a
duty to advance the interests of his clients with maximum effectiveness, within the limits of the law,1 and to do this must often
perform actions that from a moral point of view may seem dubious
or even indefensible. Whether, despite the appearance of impropriety, these actions are in fact morally allowable is generally assumed to be the central question of legal ethics. Most affirmative
t Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I presented an earlier version
of this article as a speech at the Yale Law School on November 11, 1986. I would like to
thank Alan Hirsch, Yale Law School Class of 1985, for his help in preparing this article for
publication.
The traditional use of the male pronoun "he" to refer to persons of both sexes is a
practice that has in recent years become a subject of controversy. Writers have adopted
different strategies to deal with the problems they believe this practice presents. Some, for
example, never use "he" alone, but always substitute "he or she" instead, and others alternate the use of "he" and "she," either randomly or in some regular way. The first of these
strategies I find cumbersome and the second has always seemed to me (as a reader) more
distracting than enlightening or refreshing. I have therefore elected to follow a modified
version of the traditional practice, using "he" alone most of the time and "he or she" occasionally. Whatever its vices, this approach at least possesses the virtues of clarity and economy. When I use the pronoun "he" and its variant forms in a general or impersonal sense, I
mean, of course, to refer to men and women alike.
See Comment accompanying Rule 1.2 of the American Bar Association, Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (1983) ("Model Rules"), noting that "[t]he client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits
imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations." The lawyer's professional obligations are quite limited; a lawyer is not, for example, supposed to lie to a tribunal or fail to
make disclosures necessary to avoid a fraud on the court. Id., Rule 3.3.
2 For works on legal ethics dealing primarily with issues of moral permissibility, see,
e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibility (1982); David
Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Role and Lawyers' Ethics (1983); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978); Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1978).
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answers to this question appeal to the advantages of an adversarial
system of adjudication and attempt to show that various actions
that would indeed be objectionable if performed outside the context of such a system must be encouraged, or at a minimum allowed, if the advantages of the system as a whole are to be secured.3 Arguments of this sort lead, in turn, to the further question
of whether adversarial procedures are themselves morally acceptable, a question that grows directly from our doubts about the permissibility of the more specific things that lawyers do. These
doubts culminate in uncertainties about the moral propriety of the
adversarial system as a whole, and it is to this latter topic that
Anglo-American writers on legal ethics have devoted the greatest
attention-unsurprisingly, given their preoccupation with the issue
of moral permissibility in general.
In this article, I raise, and attempt to answer, a question of a
different sort. My question does not concern the moral justifiability of what lawyers do, but the reasons a person might have for
choosing the life of a practicing lawyer in the first place.4 What is
it about the life of a lawyer that justifies the very large commitment which the decision to pursue it entails? Put differently, why
should anyone care about being or becoming a lawyer, or leading
the life to which the choice of law as a career confines one?
This question raises what is, in one sense, a subordinate problem, for it makes no sense to ask it unless we assume that the life
of a practicing lawyer is indeed a morally acceptable one (which in
turn presupposes that the actions a lawyer must routinely perform
in the course of his or her professional duties are not themselves
indefensible from a moral point of view). The life of a tyrant, as
Socrates observed, may be immensely attractive, but since it necessarily involves wrongdoing, one can never have a reason to choose

3 See, for example, Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (cited in note
2) (defending various seemingly unethical practices-withholding information about a client's previous crimes, presenting perjured testimony, "chasing ambulances"-on the
grounds that they are needed to sustain the adversary system mandated by the Constitution
and by humanitarian concerns). See also Stephan Landsman, The Adversary System: A
Description and Defense (1984) (arguing that the adversary system is itself a good thing and
that the lawyer's role in it therefore should be considered morally meritorious).
For another, recent attempt to answer this question, see James Boyd White, The
Study of Law as an Intellectual Activity: A Talk to Entering Students, in James Boyd
White, Heracles Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law 49-59 (1985) (suggesting that the life of a lawyer provides a particularly good opportunity to "learn both how
to function in an inherited culture, as a member of it, and how to function at the same time
as an individual," giving one "a double identity, as lawyer and as mind").
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it in preference to a life of moral rectitude. 5 If the life of a lawyer
were like a tyrant's-if it, too, inevitably entangled one in a web of
wrongdoing-it would be difficult to see what could be said on its
behalf. I shall assume, however, that this is not the case. It is true,
of course, that lawyers sometimes act immorally, but in contrast to
the tyrant they are not regularly required to do so by their work:
moral evil is not an intrinsic feature of the goals they pursue or the
actions they perform. I shall assume, in other words, that the life
of a lawyer is one of those a person is morally permitted to choose.
To say this, however, is only to say that such a life is among those
one may choose without disgrace. It is not to offer any reasons for
the choice itself or to suggest why one should care about becoming
a lawyer rather than anything else. This latter topic is the one I
propose to explore in this article. It is a topic that has been overshadowed, in the large literature on legal ethics, by the issue of
moral permissibility. Yet I believe it is a subject of far greater personal importance to those in the profession, to those, that is to say,
who have chosen to make their living in the law.
Why this topic has been ignored, to the degree it has, by those
interested in legal ethics is itself an interesting question, but one I
shall not pursue here. It is worth pointing out, however, that its
neglect is by no means peculiar to the field of legal ethics but is
broadly characteristic of modern moral philosophy as a whole
(with a few notable recent exceptions). The philosopher Harry
Frankfurt has observed that ethical theorists tend, in general, to be
more concerned with questions of obligation and permissibility-what am I required to do and what choices do my moral duties allow?-than with the distinct problem of what it is that I
have any reason to care about.' The general silence of moral philosophy on the subject of what we should care about suggests that
this is a topic that falls outside the domain of ethics altogether,
being largely a matter of personal taste, unassailable but also indefensible. To assume that this is so, however, is to trivialize many
of the most agonizing questions of value that we face in our lives
and to write out of ethics precisely those problems that stand most
in need of our reflective scrutiny.
In the past few years, there has been a discernible reaction
against this assumption on the part of many moral philosophers,
particularly (and perhaps surprisingly) English-speaking philoso-

See, for example, Plato, Gorgias *469-72 (W. C. HeImbold trans. 1952).
See Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 53 Synthese 257
(Nov. 1982).
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phers trained in the analytic tradition. In addition to Frankfurt, I
would mention Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, Susan Wolf,
Stuart Hampshire, Richard Wollheim, and Martha Nussbaum.7 I
write in the spirit of this reaction, and though my immediate concern is with lawyers and the lives they lead, it is my hope that
what I say will contribute to the current revival of interest in the
question of what it means, more generally, to live the life of a person,8 to have the cares and commitments, the character traits and
dispositional attitudes, that give the lives of persons their distinctive shape.
I.

INSTRUMENTALISM

A. Money and Honor
What sorts of reasons might one give, then, for the decision to
pursue a career in the law? It is best, perhaps, to begin with the
answer that many will think the least respectable, even if they also
consider it the most honest. A large number of lawyers undoubtedly believe that the life they have chosen is a desirable one because it offers great opportunities for wealth and prestige, for a
disproportionate share of society's material resources and high professional status. Lawyers are generally well-compensated for their
work and, though as a group they are often the object of popular
vilification, tend, individually, to occupy positions of distinction in
their communities. This, one might think, is reason enough to
choose a career in the law, and other explanations can easily seem
by comparison either unnecessary or disingenuous. Many, of
course, will find this view repellent and judge the lawyer who candidly admits that his or her professional goal is money and honor
and nothing else irresponsibly selfish. I, too, think this conception
of the worth or value of law practice deficient, but would place the
deficiency at a different point.
To enter the practice of law for money and honor alone is, at
bottom, to view one's professional career as a vehicle for accumulating those things that are needed in other areas of life in order to
acquire or accomplish what seems intrinsically important-important, that is, for its own sake and not as a means to
7 See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (1981); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study
in Moral Theory (1981); Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. Phil. 419 (1982); Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (1983); Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (1984); Martha
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (1986).
1 I borrow the phrase "the life of a person" from Wollheim, The Thread of Life at 2
(cited in note 7).
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some yet further end. The lawyer who takes this view of his practice treats it as a means to the things he truly cares about, the
things that claim his attention, so to speak, at the end of the working day. In this general respect, however, he is no different from
the rest of us, for we all do certain things not because we enjoy
them or find them rewarding on their own terms but because they
enable us to engage in other activities that do have these characteristics. Whether the lawyer who cares only about the pecuniary
and honorific benefits of his professional work, who treats his profession as an instrumental good with no intrinsic value of its own,
leads a life that in an overall sense is to be admired or regarded
with pity and contempt, is a question that ultimately turns on the
nature of the ends he uses the external rewards of his work to pursue. The corporate lawyer, for example, who works twelve hours a
day at tasks he finds dull and unchallenging may nevertheless be
leading a life that not only makes sense as a whole but even has
appeal or a measure of nobility. Everything depends on what happens after hours and on whether this way of accumulating the instrumental goods needed to do the important things in life is preferable to the alternatives, both in terms of what it yields and what
it takes. So a lawyer should not feel deeply ashamed to say that he
is in it just for the money and prestige, though, to be sure, he must
give us some account of what these things are for before we can
decide whether his life is one we can admire. The question of
whether he has reason to care about his professional career merges,
at this point, into the larger and less focused question of whether
he has reason to care about the things that give his life its meaning
as a whole. He may or may not; what I want to stress is that this
question is an open one even for the lawyer who values his profession not for what it is but for what it brings.
Still, as I have said, there is something deficient in this view.
The deficiency lies, I think, in the breadth of the instrumental attitude that it endorses. No doubt, we must all take an instrumental
attitude toward some of the things we do and even, in certain circumstances, toward other people (though our treatment of others
as means-in the process of contractual exchange, for example-is
usually circumscribed by obligations that reflect what might be
called a noninstrumental conception of the other person).9 What

' Consider, for example, a contract for the sale of goods. The purchaser, seeking to

obtain a particular item as inexpensively as possible, looks to the seller solely for the fulfillment of his desire. The seller, wishing to maximize profit, views the buyer solely as a source
of profit. The two regard each other as means, each being prepared to discard the other if a
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makes the nakedly instrumental view of law practice that I have
just described so unattractive is that it takes in too much of life, or
more exactly, too much of what is important in life. This should
first be understood in a purely quantitative sense. The lawyer who
works the kind of hours at the kind of pace necessary to achieve
great wealth or fame is likely to discover he has little time or energy left in which to pursue the things for whose sake he has made
his professional career the instrument or vehicle. Faulkner, it is
true, wrote As I Lay Dying in six weeks while working the nightshift in a boiler room, but his tasks were intermittent and mindlessly physical and, in any case, he was a genius. No matter how
humdrum, the practice of law is always a mental exercise and often
an emotional one, and the intellectual and spiritual resources that
a lawyer has available for his extravocational pursuits, whatever
they may be, are bound to be depleted in the course of his work
itself-significantly so if the work is as long and as demanding of
careful attention as it often is.
There is a second, nonquantitative sense in which the instrumental view is deficient and this, it seems to me, is more important
still. The deficiency I have in mind can best be brought out if we
begin by taking note of a basic fact about the nature of personal
identity. Of the various things a person does, many have no bearing on who he is, on his character or personality; he would be the
same person and have the same identity whether he happened to
do them or not. I myself feel this way, for example, about washing
the dishes and commuting to work. There are good reasons, of
course, why I do these things but I am quite confident that I would
be the same person if I had never done them or never did them
again. To be sure, others may view these particular activities in a
different light and think of them as being more directly connected
with their own distinctive identities (though I must admit that I
find this difficult to imagine). What seems to me indisputable,
however, is the presence in every person's life of some rough division between those involvements and activities that constitute his
character or personality, on the one hand, and those, on the other,
that do not, between those that make someone the person he or
she is and those one merely has or does.'0
better offer comes along. Their exploitation of one another is nevertheless bounded in a
number of ways, for example, by the doctrines of unconscionability and duress. These impose upon the parties a limited obligation to treat one another as ends in the context of
what is otherwise a mutually instrumental transaction.
10 I follow Michael Sandel's useful distinction between those traits, interests, abilities,
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Now the whole of a person's professional life can, in theory at
least, be placed on either side of this line. There is nothing, in the
nature of things, that absolutely requires that the various activities
of which one's professional existence is composed be characterforming in the sense I have suggested. I believe, however, that the
practice of law exerts a very strong pull in this direction. To practice law well requires not only a formal knowledge of the law (a
knowledge of what the legal realists termed the "paper" rules or
rules "on the books"") but certain qualities of mind and temperament as well. Most lawyers recognize this and recognize, too, that
the qualities in question are also the ones that experience in law
practice tends to encourage and confirm.
I shall have more to say, later in the article, about the nature
of these qualities, about the way they are acquired, and the role
they play in law practice. My central claim will be that they are
traits of character, permanent dispositional attitudes rooted in the
realm of feeling and desire. To accept this claim, however, is to
acknowledge that these are qualities a person cannot lose or acquire without experiencing a change of identity. It is to accept the
idea that to be a lawyer is to be a person of a particular sort, a
person with a distinctive set of character traits as well as an expertise. 12 I believe that something like this is true, in a general way, of
other professions as well and that the very notion of a profession-as distinguished from a mere technique-implies the possession of certain character-defining traits or qualities.1 " Whatever the
case may be in other professional disciplines, however, it is the aim
of this article to show that the dispositional habits which the practice of law both requires and encourages have a bearing not only
on what a person can do (like the habit, say, of touch-typing) but
on who he or she is as well (like the habits of generosity and
temperance).
The instrumental view of law practice does not give adequate
weight to this fact. If, in addition to requiring a large expenditure
of time and energy, the practice of law also has an important influ-

and desires that are "mine" and those that are simply "me." See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 55 (1982).
11The term "paper rules" was coined by Karl Llewellyn in A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 451 n.18 (1930).
" For unflattering characterizations of those who possess expertise without character,
see MacIntyre, After Virtue at 79-87 (cited in note 7); Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber 72-128 (1946).
" For an excellent account of "professionalism," see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State 8-10 (1957).
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ence on the kind of person one becomes, then the professional lawyer has reason to worry about the intrinsic value of his career as
well as its external or instrumental worth. It is perfectly legitimate
to wonder whether the sort of person one is likely to become
through long immersion in the law is the sort one may reasonably
take pride in being or have reason to wish to become. The problem
with the instrumental view is not that it answers this question one
way rather than another, but that it fails to ask it altogether and
thus obscures an important dimension of the commitment entailed
by the choice of law as a career.
B.

Public-Spiritedness

There is a second, equally familiar but more respectable way
of justifying this choice. I have in mind the justification of law
practice as a life of public service. In my view, this second justification often has the same central weakness as the first, though not as
obviously nor to the same degree.
Some men and women choose the law because they are committed to the public good and believe that law, in America at least,
is the most direct path to its attainment. 14 This attitude, of course,
is compatible with a great diversity of opinion regarding the nature
of the public good itself, and to subscribe to it one need not subscribe to any particular political orthodoxy (even an anarchist who
believes in the abolition of law may consistently endorse it). I wish
to make three points about this attitude, which might be called the
"public-spirited" view of law practice. The first is that any lawyer
who lacks it altogether is to that extent a professional failure. Lawyers or not, we all have certain basic obligations of citizenship that
require us to attend, sporadically at least, to matters of public concern, to the overall well-being of the communities in which we live.
Lawyers have these general obligations but they also have certain
special responsibilities, deriving from their status or position, to
preserve and perfect the legal institutions that in our society constitute a very large part of the public order itself."6 I shall not attempt here to justify these special responsibilities or to describe
their contours in more detail; the reasons for them are, I hope, self-

"'Consider, for example, Anne Fagan Ginger, The Relevant Lawyers (1972); Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983).
15 See Model Rules, preamble (cited in note 1) (noting that a lawyer is "a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice ....
As a public citizen, a lawyer
should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession.").
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evident, or nearly so.
My second point is that the public-spirited view, as I have
called it, is not the only view capable of justifying the choice of law
as a career. It is as much a mistake to think that the only ethically
defensible conception of law practice is one that places the pursuit
of the public good at the center of things as it is to think that
lawyers have no special duties in this regard at all. Among those
who practice law, some will find their moral fulfillment in the public interest, as some who belong to the wider community of citizens
find theirs in a wholehearted commitment to politics. But just as it
is wrong to think that a person can lead a morally respectable life
only in case he chooses politics as his vocation, so it is wrong to
assume that a lawyer who fails to carry his commitment to the
public good beyond the point that his special, but limited, professional responsibilities require is somehow morally inferior to the
lawyer who regards the attainment of these same values as the sole
justification for all he does.
The third, and most important, point I want to make about
the public-spirited conception of law practice is that it sometimes
bears a resemblance to the instrumental view described above-or,
more exactly, that it sometimes is a variant of that view and hence
vulnerable to similar criticisms. At first glance, this may seem obviously false, for we tend to assume that the instrumental lawyer,
the lawyer who works only in order to accumulate the resources he
requires in his extraprofessional life, is a person motivated by selfish desires and characterized, above all, by a total lack of that feeling for the public good that distinguishes his public-spirited counterpart. But the difference between the two can be much narrower
than our ordinary assumptions suggest. On the one side, for example, even the most thoroughgoing instrumentalist may use the material freedom he gains through work to pursue projects that,
though lacking in public-spiritedness, cannot fairly be called selfish
in the ordinary sense (like writing The Life of Johnson, for example, or working to achieve a Buddhistic selflessness through systematic meditation).
On the other side, an unbending devotion to the public good
can sometimes be in theory, and often is in psychological fact, coupled with an instrumental view of the contribution one is expected
to make toward it. The lawyer who chooses his career for publicspirited reasons alone may see himself merely as the instrument by
which some communal good is to be achieved. He may even hate
his work, find it dull and unrewarding in itself, but still consider it
the most economical route to whatever political arrangements he
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values for their own sake."6 Under other circumstances, he would
perhaps have chosen another career and he may look forward to
the abolition of the state, the law, and the class of professional
lawyers. 17 For the time being, however, it is politically imperative
that he continue to practice law, and the decision to do so will not
seem to him irrational so long as the instrumental value of his
work remains clear.
In this respect, the lawyer who views his career merely as a
vehicle for justice or equality or some other public value bears a
certain resemblance to the lawyer who regards his career as a
means, say, to the production of musical comedies or the education
of his own children. Both find the point of their professional work
in something that lies outside it, and both may be inclined to view
their choice of career as an accommodation to external necessity,
which greater family wealth or a more just political system might
have permitted them, quite happily, to avoid. To be sure, a publicspirited lawyer may find intrinsic satisfaction in his work if he believes that it not only leads to but actually constitutes an element
of the public good. If a lawyer believes, for example, that the representation of indigent clients has moral value not only because it
is likely to result in a fairer distribution of society's resources but
because it is itself one part or aspect of what such a distribution
includes, he will be more likely to think that his work has intrinsic
as well as instrumental worth.'$ Whether he does in fact think this,
however, depends on the particular conception of the public good
to which he subscribes and not merely on the fact that he happens
to take a public-spirited view of his own career. It is perfectly possible for someone to view all that he or she does for the sake of the
public good as a necessary historical expedient that forms no lasting part of the public good itself, a ladder to be discarded once the
goal has been attained, and there is evidence to suggest that some,
at least, who count themselves among the public-spirited see the
" Consider, for example, Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.
J. 1049, 1051-52, 1067 (1970) (noting that public interest law practice often "is not intellectually stimulating," acknowledging that "[m]uch of it is dull and routine," but nevertheless
advocating it because "it is the only kind of practice which offers any hope of meeting the
needs of poor people").
17 See, e.g., Unger, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 667-68 (cited in note 14); Harold Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R. 28-29 (1963) (discussing Pashukanis's view that law will wither away
after the socialist revolution).
18 See, e.g., Wexler, 79 Yale L. J. at 1049 (cited in note 16) (people want to be poverty
lawyers "because they have a moral concern which speaks. . . in favor of legal representation for everyone").
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choice of law as a career in this perspective.19
To espouse such a view is to be public-spirited in a ruthlessly
instrumental way, and any lawyer who does so in an effort to justify his professional existence runs the risks that I have associated
with instrumentalism generally. Chief among these is the risk that
he will fail to give due weight to the character-forming consequences of law practice, to the fact that by living in the law one
not only accomplishes certain things but tends to become a certain
sort of person as well. Most law students have a suspicion that this
is so, but for the instrumentalist-whether of the public-spirited
variety or not-the suspicion can easily become a nightmare if he
or she has reason to believe that the traits of character formed in
law practice are different from, or destructive of, the traits associated with whatever extraprofessional ends one happens to have
embraced. The lawyer, for example, who lives for art may fear that
his professional work will eventually dull his capacity for aesthetic
understanding, and the lawyer who lives for justice may worry that
too long an immersion in the balanced complexities of concrete
cases will dissipate his passion for systemic reform. Both fears reflect a recognition of the fact that a lawyer's profession is part of
his identity and can't be put on or off like a suit of clothes. For the
instrumentalist, who finds no intrinsic satisfaction in his work, the
realization that this is so poses a special challenge, and to meet it
he may conclude that his views must be modified in certain fundamental ways.
Whether or not the public-spirited lawyer sees his career in an
instrumentalist perspective, however, his conception of what gives
it dignity and worth will not be shared by everyone in the profession. Though I do not find this disturbing in itself, it does raise an
important question. For those who ask what reason they might
have to choose the life of a practicing lawyer, or if they have already made that choice, who wonder what can be said on behalf of
the lives they are now leading, but who find the instrumentalist
view that I have sketched depressing and feel themselves, for
whatever reason, unable to embrace the public-spirited conception
of law practice-for those lawyers and would-be lawyers (a large
fraction, I believe, of the profession as a whole), is there some
other way of thinking about the life of a practicing lawyer that
better explains its appeal? I think there is and will attempt, in the
" Roberto Unger characterizes modern leftist legal movements as aimed at "the merely
instrumental use of law and legal thought for leftist ends." 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 666 (cited in
note 14).
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remainder of the article, to describe the alternative conception I
have in mind. One of the main elements in the view I shall propose
I have introduced already: this is the notion that law practice both
requires and tends to encourage certain dispositional attitudes or
traits of character, the notion, to put it differently, that a practicing lawyer not only possesses a set of distinctive skills but is likely
to be a particular sort of person as well. It is the connection between this idea and the all-important, though obscure, concept of
judgment that I want to examine in more detail. At the juncture of
the notions of character and judgment there emerges a conception
of law practice different from those I have so far considered, one
that sees the value of what lawyers do, for the lawyers themselves,
not so much in the fruits of their work as in the excellences of
character their work requires them to develop and permits them to
display.20 Conceived in this way, the value of law practice is clearly
something intrinsic to it, a fact that distinguishes the view I shall
be developing from any form of instrumentalism, whether personal
or political.
II.

JUDGMENT

My starting point is the phenomenon of judgment itself. By
judgment I mean the process of deliberating about and deciding
personal, moral, and political problems. We are all required to exercise judgment-almost continually about trivial matters and occasionally about very important ones. We all also recognize that
some people have better judgment than others, and that the possession of good judgment is a virtue, a quality that reflects well on
the person who possesses it in the way that other virtues, like courage or temperance, do. What is this virtue of good judgment that
we are so accustomed to praising?
Given the pervasiveness of the phenomenon of judgment in
our personal and political lives, one might assume that this would
be a central question in moral and political philosophy but, interestingly enough, it is not. It is true that some philosophers (Aristotle in particular) 21 have addressed the subject, but none with
20 The reverse argument-that law practice often corrupts character-is made in An-

dreas Eshete, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter?, in Luban, The Good Lawyer at 270-85
(cited in note 2).
2' See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics *1139a-1140b. Useful discussions of Aristotle's

theory of practical judgment may be found in John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in
Aristotle 1-88 (1975); Norman 0. Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the
Will 61-73 (1984); Troels Engberg-Pederson, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight 188-222
(1983); David Wiggins and Amelie Rorty, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in Amelie
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systematic thoroughness. Indeed, since Hobbes's rational reconstruction of political theory in the seventeenth century, the nature
of judgment seems largely to have disappeared as a topic of interest among professional thinkers (with the one important exception
of Kant2 2 ). The reasons for this are unclear, but it is a fact that
anyone who takes up the subject today can expect only limited
guidance from the past.
A. Deduction and Intuition
If we begin by reflecting on our own experience, it must be
observed that one striking feature of the process of judgment is
what might be called its "nondeductive" character. To make a
judgment about how to behave in a given situation or in the context of a particular relationship is rarely, if ever, a matter simply of
deriving the appropriate conclusion from a set of established maxims by means of a fixed method or procedure, of deducing the answer one seeks in the same way a geometrician deduces the truth
or falsity of a proposed theorem by the rigorously exact technique
we call "proof."2 " A judgment may be sound or unsound, but this
cannot be established by deductive proof alone. There are, of
course, situations in which a question is nominally raised as to
what one should do where the answer follows immediately and
unambiguously from some general rule of conduct to which one is
already committed. Should I, for example, steal my friend's watch
when I find it lying on a table? To grasp the right answer in situations of this sort, however, is not normally understood to require or
reveal sound judgment, though some other virtue, like courage or
steadfastness, may be involved.24
Good judgment, and its opposite, are in fact most clearly revealed in just those situations where the method of deduction is
least applicable, where the ambiguities are greatest and the demand for proof most obviously misplaced. To show good judgment
in such situations is to do something more than merely apply a
general rule with special care and thoroughness, or follow out its
Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics 221-40 (1980).
22 For a discussion of Kant's theory of political judgment, based upon an inventive interpretation of his account of aesthetic judgment, see Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's
Political Philosophy (1982); Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment 31-71 (1983).
23 See Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 16-20 (1983) (describing in detail the way Langdell and his followers attempted to apply the methods of geometry to legal doctrines and legal education).
24 For a discussion of steadfastness and courage in the judicial arena, see Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601, 1607 (1986).
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consequences to a greater level of detail. Judgment often requires
such analytic refinement but does not consist in it alone. That this
is so is to be explained by the fact that we are most dependent on
our judgment, most in need of good judgment, in just those situations that pose genuine dilemmas by forcing us to choose between,
or otherwise accommodate, conflicting interests and obligations
whose conflict is not itself amenable to resolution by the application of some higher-order rule. It is here that the quality of a person's judgment comes most clearly into view and here, too, that his
or her deductive powers alone are least likely to prove adequate to
the task.
If judgment is more than deduction, it is tempting to conclude
that it must, to that extent, be a process of the very opposite sort,
a process that usually goes under the name of "intuition." By intuition we normally mean a form of direct insight or apprehension
distinct from any species of understanding at which one is able to
arrive by reasoning alone. To be sure, intuitive insight may be preceded by a more or less elaborate process of abstract reflection. It
is not itself, however, merely one more step in this same process,
but represents instead a break with what has come before and the
introduction of a radically different form of comprehension. We
sometimes express this idea by saying that intuition is nonreflective, and in attempting to explain what we mean often find ourselves driven back to visual metaphors in an effort to express the
peculiar immediacy of this mode of understanding. To have an intuition, we say, is simply to see that something is the case, to apprehend its obviousness in the same direct way that I apprehend,
for example, the physical shape of the room in which I am at present sitting. Conceived in this way, intuition is analogous to vision-it is how we see things with the mind's eye-and while we all
possess the power of intuitive insight to some degree, it also seems
undeniable that the abilities of human beings fall, in this regard as
in most others, along a scale, those with exceptional intuitive powers being able to see farther and more clearly than those of ordinary ability whose vision is by comparison clouded or confined.
If every problem requiring the exercise of judgment calls for
an act of intuition at the critical moment of decision regardless of
how long or how well one has deliberated about the problem in a
reflective way, if, in other words, judgment. always demands that at
some crucial point one stop thinking and look instead, then the
people who show good judgment will simply be those whose powers
of intuitive vision are the most acute. There is obviously some
truth in this, for we all know that clear thinking and good judg-
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ment are not the same thing. Yet the notion that judgment is a
form of intuition, though not as obviously mistaken as the contrasting view that it is merely a species of deduction, is misleading
too, and if anything, rather more discouraging.
It is more discouraging because it tends to bring inquiry to a
halt. Since intuition itself is nonreflective in nature, it can easily
seem intellectually inaccessible, one of those subjects that philosophers want badly to pursue but about which they have, and can
have, nothing much to say. Intuition, it is sometimes said, is a
mystery that can be experienced but never understood, at least in
the way philosophers would like to understand it.2 5 If one assumes
this to be true and assumes, in addition, that judgment is at its
heart an intuitive process, then it will seem less surprising that the
subject of judgment should have been so rarely discussed in the
long tradition of western political philosophy. The conclusion that
judgment is not a fit topic for philosophical analysis is a troubling
one, however, and seems inconsistent with the fact that many of
the most basic problems in philosophy treat matters not fully
transparent to reflective reason: the nature, for example, of aesthetic and religious experience, of death, love, imagination, and desire. Judgment is as suitable a subject for philosophy as any of
these others, and given the large role it plays in our lives, as important. If the equation of judgment and intuition is understood to
imply a contrary view, then that alone is reason to reject it.
The characterization of judgment as a form of intuition is also
importantly misleading for the following reason. If judgment is
conceived of as a process of reflection followed by a moment of
intuitive insight, then our assessment of the soundness of a particular judgment can never depend on the reasons given to support it,
since the goodness or badness of the judgment will be a function of
its intuitive brilliance and originality and these are qualities that,
by assumption, no reasoned argument can express. But as a matter
of fact, in assessing the judgments that others make and even in
evaluating the soundness of our own past decisions, we take into
account the supporting reasons offered to explain and justify them.
A person of good judgment is not someone who from time to time
merely makes certain strikingly appropriate oracular pronouncements-that is what prophets and seers do-but who is able, as
well, to provide a compelling framework of ideas for the decisions
he or she arrives at. These decisions are not deducible by reason
2 For a discussion of this claim, see Richard Rorty, Intuition, in 3-4 The Encyclopedia

of Philosophy 210-92 (1967).
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alone, but neither is their soundness entirely self-evident-something we either see or not depending on our own powers of intuitive comprehension. Good judgment, to put it differently, has an
argumentative dimension which its equation with intuitive genius
obscures.
There is a further reason why the equation of judgment and
intuition is misleading. Intuition is today most often thought of as
a gift: one either possesses it as part of one's original inventory of
abilities or one does not and in either case there is little that can
be done to alter the situation. This view, which in part reflects the
characteristically modern association of intuition with art and artistic ability, 26 renders problematic the connection between intui-

tion, on the one hand, and experience and character on the other.
If intuition is a gift, we should expect to see evidence of it even in
very young people; but the kind of intuitive insight that good judgment requires is universally associated with long experience and
hence with age. There are prodigies in mathematics but none, as
Aristotle notes, 27 in the field of practical affairs-which is a reason
either to revise our notion of what intuition is or abandon the
claim that judgment is intuitive in nature. Furthermore, if we view
a person's intuitive abilities as a kind of gift, it is difficult to see
what connection they can have with his character, which always
takes time to develop and cannot be regarded as a gift at all. This
would not raise a problem if good judgment were not thought to be
as much a trait of character as an intellectual capacity. But for
reasons I shall explain, we do quite properly view it in this way
and hence must choose again between modifying our conception of
intuition and qualifying the claim that judgment is best understood as a form of intuitive understanding.
B. Sympathy and Detachment
I have now considered two different ways of thinking about
judgment-one that views it as a species of deduction and the
other as a kind of intuition-and found both to be inadequate. The
time has come for me to say something more positive about my
subject. I propose to begin by examining more closely what a philosopher might call the "phenomenology" of judgment, s the felt
See Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry 223 (1953).
Nicohmachean Ethics *1095a.
28 I use the term in the loose sense that many philosophers do, and without any intention of endorsing the specific methods associated with the philosophical school that goes
under the same name.
28
27
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experience of judging itself. I mean to explore, more exactly, the
experience of a certain sort of judging, the sort that we engage in
when trying to make an important personal decision about our
lives-the decision, for example, to get married, have a child, or
pursue a particular career. First-personal decisions of this sort are
not, of course, the only ones in which judgment plays a role; we
must also exercise judgment in the advice we give to others and in
the political choices that we make. It is difficult, in fact, to identify
an area of our private or public lives that does not provide a theatre for the exercise of judgment or depend upon its proper use.
The phenomenon of judgment has certain general features, however, which are most easily discernible in its first-personal form,
and it is for this reason that I have chosen to begin my account of
judgment at this point. When I return to the subject of political
judgment later in the article, it will be my aim to show that what I
have said about the structure of personal deliberation holds in the
realm of politics as well.
We must all, from time to time, make hard personal
choices-to get married or divorced, go to law school or drop out,
support a parent or renounce a friend. If we find such choices difficult, it is usually because the alternatives seem in some fashion
incommensurable. Each has its own balance of advantages and disadvantages and there is no common metric that permits us to assess their relative attractiveness in a decisive and unambiguous
way. The choice that we must make cannot, therefore, simply be a
matter of deduction or calculation, as utilitarians sometimes suggest. Nor is it a matter merely of waiting for the appropriate intuition, the one that will tell us what to do. We tend to deal with our
personal dilemmas, even the intractable ones, in a more active and
methodical way than that. Choices of the sort I have in mind call
not for deduction or intuition but deliberation, which is another
name for judgment. Indeed, it is precisely in situations of this
kind, where the choice to be made is between alternatives not easily compared, that our reliance upon the faculty of judgment is
most evident. In exercising this faculty, what exactly is it that we
do?
The answer, I think, is something like the following. When
faced with an important personal decision, I am frequently required to make what amounts to a choice among competing ways
of life-different ways of life that might be mine though none of
them, by assumption, yet is, at least in its fully developed form. To
make such a choice, I must explore the alternatives in my imagina-
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tion. 29 That is to say, I must make the effort to see and feel, from
within, what each would be like were I to choose it rather than the
others. The effort to do this is not unlike the everyday attempts we
make to understand the experience of other people, 30 and it resembles, too, the attempt that historians and anthropologists make to
understand those who are remote from them in time and cultural
attitude.31 In these latter cases, of course, it is other people and not
ourselves that we are struggling to understand. But the self I will
become if I embrace a certain way of life may very well seem, at
the moment of decision, something of a stranger too, a person both
familiar and remote in the way that other people often are. So to
grasp the possibilities before me, even where they are only different ways of living my own life, I need the same sort of imaginative
powers that are required to make sense of someone else's situation
or experience. What is needed, above all else, is a certain measure
of compassion, in the literal sense of "feeling with." I must make
the effort, in choosing a life for myself, to feel along with each of
the persons I might become the special cares and concerns, the
risks and opportunities, that give the experience of that possible
future self its own distinctive shape.
This is not always easy to do. Much in the experience of my
imaginary future selves is bound to remain opaque to me, so
opaque, in fact, that I fail even to notice how little I understand.
And though I may have an abstract conviction that a particular
way of life would be the best one for me, all things considered, my
present affections may pull so strongly in another direction that I
am unable to feel any genuine compassion for the person I believe
I ought to be. Still, even with these qualifications, our powers of
compassionate understanding seem sufficiently robust to carry us
across the distances that separate us from others and from our own
future selves and to permit us to take up-only partially, perhaps,
but in a spirit of fellow-feeling-their preoccupations and
concerns.
If a person who is faced, say, with a choice between alternative
careers must make an effort to grasp in imagination each of the
different ways of life these alternatives represent, if it is essential
to his deliberations that he entertain their claims sympathetically
29 See Anthony Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character, 4 Soc. Phil. &
Pol. 203 (Aut. 1986).
30 Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy 8-36 (1954).

31 See Max Weber, Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, in Edward
Shils and Henry Finch, eds., The Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949).
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and see each in the best possible light (the light in which one devoted to that way of life would see it), it is also necessary that he
maintain a certain distance or detachment from the points of view
he is attempting to understand. From each imaginative foray into a
possible future career, he must be able to withdraw to the standpoint of decision, which is the standpoint he occupies at present.
At least he must be able to do this if he is genuinely to make a
decision among the alternatives rather than merely be swept along
by the tide of feeling that any sympathetic association with a particular way of life-even if it is only an imagined way of life-can
easily arouse. To ensure that this does not happen, to ensure that
he remains sufficiently detached to survey all the alternatives from
a vantage point different from any of their own internal points of
view, it is necessary that he hold something in reserve even while
making a maximum effort at imaginative understanding. The person faced with a hard choice must give each alternative its due; he
must entertain all the possibilities by feeling for himself what is
most attractive in each. But he must do this while withholding his
commitment to any.
One way of expressing this idea is to say that the process of
deliberation is peculiarly bifocal. Through one lens, the alternatives are seen not merely at close range but actually from within;
through the other, all the alternatives are held at an identical distance.32 As anyone who has ever put on a pair of bifocal glasses
knows, it takes time to learn to shift smoothly between perspectives and the effort to do so can easily give one a headache. The
same is true of deliberation: it is difficult to be sympathetic, and
difficult to be detached, but what is most difficult of all is to be
both at once. Yet it is in just this combination of opposite-seeming
attributes that the process of deliberation consists. Deliberation is
neither deduction nor intuition. It is the compassionate survey of
alternatives viewed simultaneously from a distance, and those who
show excellence in deliberation and whose judgment we value are
the men and women best able to meet these conflicting requirements and to endure the often considerable tension between
them. 3

32 The tension between these two points of view resembles the tension that Thomas
Nagel describes in both thought and morality between the perspective of one's own self and
that of the universe as a whole. See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 3 (1986).
"3For a similar account, see Beiner, Political Judgment at 102-28 (cited in note 22).
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C. Deliberation and Choice
To this last proposition, it may be objected that in ascribing
sound judgment to a person we mean not only to imply that he or
she is able to entertain an especially wide range of alternatives but
able, as well, to make the proper choice among them. A person of
sound judgment, it will be said, is one who regularly makes the
right decision, a fact that my "procedural" account of judgment
appears to ignore. I do of course agree that in attributing sound
judgment to a person we are saying something about the sorts of
decisions he makes as well as the deliberative procedures he employs in making them. I also believe, however, that these two aspects of judgment are connected and that the choices of a person
who deliberates well-with sympathy and detachment-are themselves likely to be sound or practically wise in a sense that I shall
now explain.
Someone faced with a difficult personal decision must make an
effort, as I have said, to entertain the competing concerns that the
possibilities before him represent; he must make an effort to enter,
in imagination, each of the ways of life between which he will eventually have to choose. Now the critical term here is "entertain."
What exactly do I mean by it? By entertain, I mean something
different from and less than complete endorsement. To entertain a
set of values is not to make them one's own without condition or
reservation, but to take them up with a measure of detachment
that sets these values apart from those to which one is at present
actually committed.. By the same token, however, I also mean
something different from and more than a mere knowledge of the
fact that the values in question happen to be the ones associated
with a particular way of life. I may be said to have entertained a
set of values, rather than simply taken account of their existence,
only when I have succeeded in seeing them in a sympathetic light
and have experienced for myself something of their power and appeal. Entertaining a value or concern, then, is an attitude midway
between adopting it and merely acknowledging its existence.
Though familiar to us all, this midway attitude is surprisingly difficult to describe. Perhaps the best we can do is say that it is the
attitude of fellow-feeling, a term that suggests the combination of
compassion and detachment I mean to emphasize.
It is helpful to think of the different ways of life that a person
confronts when required to make an important decision about his
future as representing different parts or aspects of himself, each
part being developed in a way that requires the neglect or subordi-
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nation of certain others. 34 Choices of this sort are inevitable in any
moderately complicated human existence, and one of the great
challenges of personal life is to discover the way of living that best
accommodates all the different things one wishes to do and be.
Since it is impossible to be them all, however, it is even more important to discover which way of life is most likely to preserve a
relation of fellow-feeling or friendship, as Aristotle calls it, 35 among
the different parts of one's own self, some of which must necessarily be subordinated for the sake of others. A person whose soul
has, in Aristotle's phrase, "friendly feelings" toward itself," a person whose parts are not openly at war or engaged in subtler contests of repression and revenge, possesses a quality of wholeness
that is best described by the simple term "integrity." Most often,
of course, we use this term to describe the steadiness of action and
purpose, the reliability of character, the dignity of self-respect that
a person shows in relations with others and in his or her conduct
generally. It is difficult, however-if, indeed, it is possible at
all-to sustain an outward constancy of this sort without the inward friendship of which Aristotle speaks. If a person's soul is divided against itself the pressures of the world are likely, in time, to
explode whatever fragile truce has been established among its
parts. The alternative is not the elimination of all conflict in the
soul-after Freud we cannot hope or even wish for a psychic unanimity of this sort. Nor is it the kind of harmonic ordering of
higher and lower parts that Plato proposes in the Republic,3 7 an
ordering that no longer has for us the naturalness it had for him.
The alternative is sympathy toward oneself, and to a large degree
it is on this attitude that the basic good of integrity depends.
Though the measure of integrity that a person achieves is in
part, like most things, a matter of luck (including the luck of his
original endowment of feeling and intelligence)," it is also a function of the various choices that he makes, for these are likely, over
time, either to strengthen the friendly attitude that Aristotle describes or to encourage its opposite-self-hatred and a spirit of regret.3" It is this difference, a difference in the consequences that
11This is of course an ancient metaphor. See Plato, Republic *435e-445e (Allan Bloom
trans. 1968).
35 Nicomachean Ethics *1168b.
3, Id.
"I Republic *444d.
38 See Williams, Moral Luck at 20-39 (cited in note 7).
3, Nicomachean Ethics *1150b. My account of the good of integrity draws heavily on
Aristotle's analysis of the phenomenon of "moral weakness" or weakness of will. Id. *1145a.
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important choices have for the achievement or preservation of integrity, that marks the line, in personal matters at least, between
those decisions that show good judgment and those that do not. If
we say, for example, that someone has shown good judgment in his
choice of a career, it is not because the particular career he has
chosen-the career, say, of a scholar, artist, athlete, or entrepreneur-is intrinsically superior to the others he might have pursued
instead. We have no basis for making such comparisons, at least
with regard to those ways of life that have a prima facie claim to
worthiness (of which the number is large even if it is not infinite).
There is, however, another way of understanding what is meant by
the claim that a person has shown good judgment in making the
decisions that have turned his life in one direction rather than another. To assert this is to claim that he has chosen a life which
allows him the reasonable hope of a stable friendship among his
different parts, among the interests he has had to abandon or
subordinate and those at the center of his life (a condition of the
soul which, though often associated with some rough matchup between a person's career and his abilities, may be present where the
matchup is absent and missing where it exists). When we call a
personal decision wise or say that it shows good judgment, what we
mean is that it promotes integrity by increasing the chances that
the person who has made it will be able to live with himself on
amicable terms. In the domain of personal life, wise judgments
lead to integrity and unwise ones to disintegration and regret. This
is the only meaning these terms can have, in this domain at least,
so long as we lack a scale along which to rank the worthiness of the
different ways of life to which human beings may reasonably and
responsibly devote themselves.
With one additional observation, I can complete my explanation of why those who deliberate well are also likely to make wise
choices. I have said that excellence in deliberation requires a certain combination of sympathy and detachment; without these
qualities, a person cannot entertain the different values associated
with the ways of life between which difficult decisions compel him
to choose. A person who deliberates with sympathetic detachment,
however, will just for that reason be more likely to make those
choices that increase his chances of living a life of integrity-wise
choices, in the sense that term must be understood in first-per-

For an illuminating discussion of Aristotle's treatment of this subject, see David Wiggins,
Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire, in Rorty,
ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics at 241-66 (1980) (cited in note 21).
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sonal matters. The reason is that all genuine deliberation, as distinguished from mere deduction and delphic intuition, demands
the exercise of the very fellow-feeling in which integrity consists.
To deliberate about a personal problem is to show this fellow-feeling toward oneself, and it is impossible to develop such an attitude
and employ it regularly over any considerable period of time without becoming the kind of person for whom the attitude itself has
value, the kind of person, that is to say, who thinks it important to
try to understand concerns other than those that are at present
most centrally his own and who takes pleasure in his ability to do
so. A person like this is bound to value his integrity. Indeed, the
pleasure he takes in his powers of fellow-feeling, in his ability to be
at once sympathetic and detached toward his own conflicting concerns, is just another way of describing the experience of integrity
itself. The person who deliberates well is likely, as a result, to have
a taste for that special form of self-regarding friendship in which
integrity consists and to choose for himself a life that assigns the
good of integrity a central place. Or, to put the same point differently, someone who shows good judgment in the way he deliberates
is likely to show the same good judgment in the decisions that he
makes, which is what I have been trying to establish.
D.

Judgment and Character

This last argument rests on a series of assumptions that I want
to clarify before proceeding, even at the risk of repeating what I
have already said. I have claimed that sympathy and detachment
are crucially important features of first-personal deliberation and
have suggested that together they make possible a form of understanding that is unattainable without them. It would be a mistake,
however, to think that either this particular form of understanding
or the qualities that make it possible can be adequately described
in cognitive terms alone. The person who is able to entertain a certain way of life with sympathetic detachment does indeed know
something that the person unable to adopt this attitude does not.
What he or she knows, however, is what it is like to have that way
of life as one's own, and this is a type of knowledge that can only
be acquired by taking on, in a tentative way, the cares and concerns of the life itself.
We all recognize the difference between knowing, for example,
that alcohol can change a person's behavior and knowing what it is
like to be drunk. Even little children and lifelong teetotalers have
the former sort of knowledge, but it takes some experience with
alcohol to acquire an understanding of the latter kind. What dis-
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tinguishes this second sort of knowledge is its affectual component.
Such knowledge is more than merely cognitive, for it consists, in
part at least, of a residue of feeling that can be described in propositions but acquired only through experience. The person who
seeks, in a spirit of sympathetic detachment, to understand some
way of life other than the one he happens to be leading aims at a
similar kind of knowledge through the imaginative analogue of experience and to the extent he is successful, also takes away a residue of feeling. It is this that distinguishes his knowledge of the life
in question from the knowledge he would possess if he merely understood, in the way an unsympathetic observer might, that those
who lead it have certain attitudes and preferences. And just as the
knowledge he acquires has an affectual component, so too the capacities he exercises in acquiring it have an affectual dimension as
well; more exactly, they include certain capacities for feeling along
with other, unambiguously cognitive powers. Sympathy is a capacity for the production of feeling, and detachment a capacity for the
moderation or confinement of feeling. Both belong to the economy
of our affective life and serve to regulate its forces. To deliberate
well-which requires both sympathy and detachment-one must
therefore be able not only to think clearly but to feel in certain
ways as well. The person who shows good judgment in deliberation
will thus be marked as much by his affective dispositions as by his
intellectual powers, and he will know more than others do because
he feels what they cannot.
Where these dispositions are habitual, they constitute traits of
character, defining features of one's person. That this is so appears
to be confirmed by our ordinary understanding of what is meant
by the claim that someone possesses good judgment, for we generally interpret this as an observation about the person's character,
about the kind of person he or she is, and not merely as a comment
about his or her intellectual abilities. Character traits are generally
associated with distinctive patterns of feeling, patterns of desire
and aversion as well as modes of thought. On this familiar view, to
have a particular trait is not only to hold certain beliefs or to think
in a particular way, but to like some things and dislike others with
steady regularity. What the person of good judgment habitually
desires, and hence what defines this particular trait of character,
we have seen already. In first-personal deliberation, at least, it is
that wholeness of soul in which the good of integrity consists.
E. Politics
In my account of judgment I have, up to this point, been
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speaking exclusively of the sort of judgment that individuals exercise in their own private lives with regard to their personal fates.
Judgment also has a public face, however, and it is to this dimension of it that I now turn.
Many important human activities are pursued collectively and
have goals that can be achieved only through the coordinated action of many individuals. Certain activities belonging to this broad
class are further distinguished, however, by the fact that they have
as their goal the well-being of some community or collectivity itself. To take a simple example, most of those who join a voluntary
association (a political party or church society or museum foundation) are likely to do so because they believe in the association's
goals and wish to see them realized. In almost every association of
this sort, however, there will be some who are charged with responsibility for preserving the well-being of the association itself, for
seeing that the rent is paid, circulars mailed, meetings held, and
disputes among members (when they arise) resolved in the way
that is best from the association's point of view. Those who bear
these responsibilities have a set of special concerns that most
members do not, concerns we may call "organizational" or "associational" to indicate that their focal point is the well-being of the
whole community to which the individual members belong.
In many communities, of course, there is likely to be little disagreement among the members regarding the nature and purpose
of their common enterprise (though the absence of such disagreement is always a contingent matter that is subject to change).
Where there is disagreement about the character and aims of a
community, however, the associational concerns of those who are
responsible for maintaining its well-being assume a much greater
scope and urgency. When this happens, we may say that the concerns in question become "political" in character. To be sure, this
way of speaking is broader than ordinary usage might appear to
warrant, and does not coincide with the familiar distinction between public and private activities. It does, however, mark out a
class of endeavors that have something important in common and
helps to explain what we mean when we describe the actions of
people even in a private setting (a corporate boardroom, for example, or law school faculty meeting) as essentially political in nature.
Politics, broadly defined in the way I have proposed, includes
a great deal. It certainly includes, for example, the administration
of many private organizations-universities, foundations, and
profitmaking corporations-as well as the management of cities,
states, and nations. Each of these activities, of course, has special
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requirements of its own. To the extent they are political in the
broad sense, however, all require judgment of a type that is analogous to the personal judgment each individual must exercise on his
or her own behalf in the sphere of private life. What makes these
two forms of judgment analogous is the fact that both have as their
object the construction of a friendly or fraternal whole out of conflicting parts, in one case the parts of a single soul and in the other
the parts of a community, the separate individuals who make it up.
In any given community, politics is the business of attending
to the community's overall well-being, and the practitioners of
politics will be most visible-and badly needed-when the aims or
purposes of the community are in dispute. One who engages in
politics must of course have some conception of what these aims or
purposes are; without such a conception, political activity would
literally be pointless. 40 In arriving at his own views, however, and
in attempting to guide the community by them, it is essential that
he exercise good judgment-which here, as in first-personal deliberation, requires both sympathy and detachment and the ability to
combine the two. Before he decides in which direction his community should move and how current controversies about its future
ought to be resolved, any would-be leader must survey the alternatives, place himself imaginatively in the position of each of the
controversialists, and make an effort to see matters from their
point of view. He must entertain their concerns in the sense suggested earlier. The different possible futures that an institution
faces at every critical juncture in its history resemble the different
ways of life between which an individual must choose at certain
decisive moments in his own career. In the former case, as in the
latter, what deliberation requires above all else is the effort to see
each of these futures in its best possible light.4 1
Once this has been done, of course, a decision must still be
made. But the standard by which we assess the wisdom of the
choices in which deliberation terminates is the same here, in the
political realm, as in first-personal matters. It is the mark of a wise
or statesmanlike political decision that it enables the members of a
community-its constituent parts-to live together in fellow-feeling despite the real differences of opinion that have divided them
in the past and that will undoubtedly continue to divide them in
40 See Weber, Politics as a Vocation in Gerth and Mills, eds., From Max Weber at 11517 (cited in note 12).
41 See Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the evolution and self-critical refinement of tra-

ditions in After Virtue at 222-23 (cited in note 7).
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the future. Put differently, it is the sign of a wise political judgment that it promotes community, not through the construction of
a false and unattainable unanimity, but in the only way that
human beings with strongly divergent interests are ever likely to
achieve it: by strengthening the capacity of each to entertain the
views of those with whom he disagrees, a capacity that has traditionally gone under the name of political fraternity.4 2 Fraternity is
at once something less than unanimity and more than tolerance;
like the midway attitude of sympathy, it belongs between these extremes of identity and indifference. Among the members of a community, we might say, fraternity is the analogue of integrity in the
soul of a single person.43 Those who know how to achieve these two
related goods, and who have the desire to do so, may, with as much
justification in the one case as in the other, and for essentially similar reasons, be said to exhibit the virtue of good judgment.
III. THE GOOD LAWYER
At the end of Part I, after criticizing the instrumental and
public-spirited conceptions of law practice, I suggested a third possible justification for the choice of a lawyer's life, one that locates
the worth and appeal of such a life not in anything it leads to or
produces but in the excellences of character that are demanded by
and displayed in law practice itself. I suggested, in addition, that
this third conception could best be approached through an analysis
of the phenomenon of judgment, and in Part II examined this subject in some detail. My aim in Part III is to show that a proper
understanding of the faculty of judgment gives lawyers grounds for
believing in the intrinsic value of what they do and hence for
choosing a life in the law, whatever other (instrumental and public-spirited) reasons they may have.
To achieve competence in the practice of law one must, of
course, master a considerable body of doctrine and be familiar with
the distinctive forms of argument the law employs. The truly distinguished lawyer, however, the one who is recognized by his or her
peers in the profession as an exemplary practitioner and whose
work is marked by subtlety and imagination, possesses more than
mere doctrinal knowledge and argumentative skill. What sets such
a lawyer apart and makes him a model for the profession as a
42 See Aristotle, Politics *1280b-1281a, *1295b. For a discussion of these concepts, see

Anthony T. Kronman, Aristotle's Idea of Political Fraternity, 24 Amer. J. Jurisprudence 114

(1979).
13

See Plato, Republic *435e-449a.
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whole is not how much law he knows or how cleverly he speaks,
but how wisely he makes the judgments that his professional tasks
require. When one lawyer wishes to praise the work of another, the
compliment he is most likely to pay him is to say that he is a person of sound judgment. Nothing counts more among practicing
lawyers than this. Indeed, if one looks mainly to the rhetoric of the
profession4 4 (which, at the very least, can tell us something about
how lawyers see themselves), it would appear that chief among the
virtues lawyers admire and believe essential to their work is the
virtue of sound judgment or prudence, to use an older term whose
meaning has undergone a radical alteration in modern times.4 5
Law is not, of course, the only activity in which sound judgment is highly valued. It is generally thought, for example, that an
outstanding statesman or diplomat is distinguished by his possession of this same capacity. But whatever the case may be in other
fields of endeavor, high achievement in the law is most often associated by practitioners themselves not only, or even primarily, with
knowledge and intellect, but rather with the faculty of judgment,
the power of deliberation and discernment that the most troubling
cases invariably require and for which no doctrinal sophistication,
or sheer intellectual brilliance, is ever a satisfactory substitute.
There is some danger of confusion here and I want, therefore,
to make my position as clear as possible. My claim is that law
practice is an activity (more exactly, an ensemble of related activities) that can be performed well or badly or merely adequately,
and that to excel at these activities, one must possess the quality I

" See, for example, William Rehnquist, Sound Advice to Young Lawyers-and Older
Ones Too, The Reporter 21-22 (Summer 1986) ("The senior partner in the law firm-the
'rainmaker'-does not know more about the law than the junior partners or the associates.
But he has that indefinable something that makes clients turn to him, not just for an opinion on strictly legal matters, but for his judgment as to how they ought to conduct their
affairs."); Judicial Conference-D.C. Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 111, 119 (1983) (remarks of Judge
Cotter praising the sound judgment of Judge John Lewis Smith); Milton Freeman, Abe Fortas Was My Partner, The Reporter 17-18 (Dec. 1983) (praising Fortas's wisdom and sound
judgment and noting that it was this quality of his that led the Supreme Court to appoint
him defense counsel in the famous Gideon case: "They were seriously considering overruling
a 21 year old precedent. They wanted counsel from a wise adviser as to the means of doing
so without causing important conflict within the Court. He so understood his mission, and it
was indeed accomplished with a unanimous judgment and three concurring opinions, all
consistent with a calm and nondivisive resolution of the important problem.").
" Kant is largely responsible for this. In Kant's moral philosophy, the term "prudence," as a result of its equation with enlightened self-interest, loses its ancient meaning
and takes on its characteristically modern one. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles
of the Metaphysics of Morals 18-19, in Thomas K. Abbott, ed., Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason and Other Works (1873).
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call good judgment. I also mean to make a second and closely related claim: that the practice of law tends to promote the development of this same trait, for the general reason that long participation in any activity encourages those powers and abilities that
excellence in the activity requires. From these two claims, it does
not follow, and I do not mean to suggest, that anyone who practices law is bound to acquire good judgment, or that good judgment cannot be acquired outside the law in other professional disciplines or, indeed, through the experience of living generally.
There are, as I have indicated, fields of endeavor other than the
law in which good judgment is required and that tend, in turn, to
foster it. There are also many people who learn good judgment
outside the arena of work, in their private relations with family,
friends and lovers. None of this, however, is inconsistent with the
belief that some activities depend more than others on the exercise
of good judgment (as distinguished from mere skill, which all complex activities require) and show a special tendency to call it forth
in those who regularly perform them. Nor is it inconsistent with
the claim that law practice is one of the activities belonging to this
class. I maintain that it is, and maintain, as well, that good judgment, unlike mere skill, is a trait of character. The lawyer who accepts this last proposition can justify his choice of career in terms
the instrumentalist cannot-as the choice of a way of life and type
of character. That this same justification, or something close to it,
is available to the practitioners of other professions (though not, I
believe, to those engaged in every line of work) does not make it
less available to lawyers or detract from the significance it has for
them.
It remains to be shown that law practice does in fact require
the exercise of good judgment, as lawyers generally assume. I have
taken note of this assumption, and endorsed it, but so far have
said nothing in its defense. Instead of defending the broad claim
that a good lawyer must possess sound judgment, however, I shall
defend three somewhat narrower propositions: that a good judge, a
good counselor, and a good advocate must each possess this quality. These are, in Karl Llewellyn's phrase,46 the three main "lawjobs" and it will be useful to decompose the global concept of law
practice into them. Though lawyers do other things, these are their
principal occupations and if it can be shown that good judgment is
required in all three, we may reasonably conclude that it is needed
46 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of
Juristic Method, 49 Yale L. J. 1355 (1940).
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in law practice generally.
I begin with adjudication. Judges are lawyers who have been
selected from the ranks of their profession on the assumption that
they possess in special measure the excellences of the profession as
a whole. It is therefore natural to assume that these same excellences will be displayed with special clarity in the work they do.
My claim is that a good judge is distinguished by his capacity for
sympathetic detachment, by his possession of the two qualities
that form the basis of good judgment generally. I shall argue that
the same is true of counselors and advocates as well.
A. Judging
Before reaching his decision in a case, a judge must make an
effort to see the claims of the parties before him in their best possible light, which means with as much sympathy as he is able short
of actually endorsing any of the positions in question. It is not
enough that a judge be an interpretive genius, a Hercules of the
law who is able to construct out of the resources of his own intellect a deep and elegant theory to support his decision in the case at
hand. It is also necessary that he appreciate what the decision
means to the parties and to those who identify with or support
them, for how he presents the decision, the words he chooses to
explain and defend it and often the content of the decision itself,
will depend on his estimate of its meaning to the parties and the
groups they represent. This is something no mere comparison of
the depth and elegance of different theories can reveal.4 7 Only by
sympathetically reviewing the case from the parties' own perspectives can a judge gain such understanding. In doing so, of course,
he must also maintain his distance from the parties' concerns, and
the great challenge in judging is to remain detached while simultaneously exercising a maximum of sympathy toward the parties and
their conflicting claims. A judge who fails in the first respect shows
bias or favoritism and one who fails in the second, hardheartedness-the twin vices between which every judge must thread his
way.
A judge who succeeds in doing so is likely to see the function
of his decisions in a certain light: to clarify the law and improve it,
of course, but also to preserve the bonds of community that legal
conflict often strains. He will do this by searching out solutions
47 See generally Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables,
93 Yale L. J. 455 (1984).
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that make it possible for the parties, and those who identify with
them, to live on amicable terms even after a judgment has been
rendered that places the prestige and power of the law on one side
rather than another. Any judge habituated to the practice of sympathy will be inclined to view this last task as one of his chief responsibilities. The exercise of his own sympathetic powers is likely
to awaken in such a judge an appetite for the fellow-feeling in
which the community of law itself consists, and he will be anxious
to do what he is able to establish and preserve it. A judge may be
intellectually brilliant and socially farsighted, but what makes his
judgments wise is another quality altogether-his own personal capacity to satisfy the conflicting claims of sympathy and detachment, and the tendency of his decisions to promote a similar atti48
tude among the members of his community generally.
B.

Counseling

A lawyer representing a client is in a very different position
from that of a judge. Judges are obliged to remain scrupulously
neutral among the interests of those who appear before them, but
lawyers are expected to show a zealous partiality toward the interests of their clients, to do what they are able, within the limits of
the law, to advance these interests and to serve as their champion
when they come into conflict with the interests of other parties.
Yet like their counterparts on the bench, practicing lawyers are
regularly required to exercise judgment in their professional work
and the deliberative powers they employ in doing so are essentially
the same. Soundness of judgment is needed as badly in the representation of clients as it is in the decision of cases and though the
contexts differ, the nature of the faculty itself does not.
Consider, first, the work of a lawyer to whom a client has come
seeking counsel regarding some contemplated course of action.
Many people conceive, or perhaps I should say misconceive, the
lawyer's role in situations of this sort to be purely instrumental:
the client declares his objective and the lawyer (after researching
the matter) tells him whether the goal in question is attainable by
18 See the remarks of Dean Acheson in praise of Justice Cardozo, in Roger F. Jacobs,
ed., 1 Memorials of the Justices of the Supreme Court 456-57 (1981) ("He was able to bring
to the aid of judgment an appreciation of phases of life which he had not experienced and
respect for the values and ideas of other men which he understood, even if he did not share.
.. . This inner grace enabled [him] . . . to speak with understanding and tolerance of the
conditions of men and ideas, and, at the same time, with a rugged practicality and common
sense.").
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legal means and, on the assumption that it is, outlines the most
effective method of doing what the client wishes. A large part of
law practice does consist, no doubt, in giving ministerial advice of
this sort-but not the most interesting, or rewarding, or estimable
part. For one thing, in addition to finding means for ends their
clients have already set, lawyers regularly help to clarify these ends
themselves and even on occasion act as midwives without whom
the ends might never come to light. 49 By this I do not mean that
lawyers function as their clients' conscience, passing moral sentence on their goals and plans (though every responsible lawyer
recognizes that he or she must, from time to time, be prepared to
do precisely this). What I mean is simply that clients often come to
lawyers with confused or conflicting ends and that it is frequently
part of a lawyer's job to help the client see what it is that he
wishes to do and to decide whether, on reflection, he really wants
to do it.
To design an efficient legal strategy for the attainment of some
predetermined end requires a knowledge of the law and often considerable cleverness as well. Something more is needed, however, if
a lawyer is to play a responsible role in helping his client identify
and choose an appropriate set of ends in the first place. What is
needed is judgment, the same combination of sympathy and detachment that a person must possess in order to deliberate wisely
about his own ends. The wise counselor is one who is able to see
his client's situation from within and yet, at the same time, from a
distance, and thus to give advice that is at once compassionate and
objective.5 0 The merely clever 5 lawyer, the hired gun, is incapable
of giving such advice, and though clients may rely upon his tactical
assessments, they are unlikely to seek his counsel, or value his
judgment, in matters where practical wisdom is required.
A second task that lawyers regularly perform, and one that
also requires real judgment as distinct from mere cleverness or legal erudition is one that is analogous to the task of communitybuilding that I have argued is an important part of the judicial
enterprise. When a client wishes to embark with others on some
common venture, it is the lawyer's job-or the job of several law4
For an analysis of the role lawyers play in shaping preferences, as distinguished from
merely executing them, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences,
53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129 (1986).
50 See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976).
51 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics *1144a-1144b (distinguishing between cleverness
and wisdom).
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yers working together-to give the undertaking a legally effective
form. In general, however, it is also the lawyer's job to find, or
rather to invent, a framework of rights and obligations that will
accommodate the different and frequently conflicting interests of
those involved. The framework in question, whether it takes the
shape of a partnership or contract or corporation, may quite properly be described as a community of sorts and the lawyers working
to create it must know not only what the law allows and their own
clients wish, but what the other members of the community want
as well. This they can discern only through the exercise of a sympathetic imagination, and the lawyer who lacks such imagination
will be handicapped in his efforts to fashion a community able to
withstand even the mildest shocks that an unpredictable future
holds in store. Every lawyer who has ever drafted a contract, or
created a partnership, has participated in the foundation of a small
commonwealth, and the excellences he requires in his work might
be described as the excellences, in miniature, of a founding statesman. Chief among these is good judgment-the combination of
sympathy and detachment that makes it possible to hold in view a
range of different interests and to anticipate, in imagination, those
arrangements most likely to preserve some measure of amicability
among them.
C.

Advocacy

Can it be said that advocates, like judges and counselors, require wisdom, rather than mere cleverness or cunning, in the work
they do? This is an important question, for although the practice
of law includes much more than advocacy in the narrow sense, it is
advocacy that is most often taken, by lawyers and laypersons alike,
to reveal the truth about the profession as a whole and the character of those engaged in it. 52 It is a question, moreover, which one
might think must be answered in the negative, for it is unclear that
practical wisdom, as I have characterized it, is in any sense required for the successful advocacy of a client's cause.
The job of an advocate, unlike that of a counselor, generally
begins only when his client's interests have already been fixed with
a high degree of certainty and his primary task cannot properly be
described as that of building a community of any sort. Indeed, the

" See Schwartz, 66 Cal. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 2) (noting that non-advocate
functions often are regarded "almost as exceptions to the primary role of lawyers as
advocates").
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aim of the advocate often seems to be precisely the opposite: to
destroy communities (of contract, sentiment, and shared experience) for the sake of the particular interest he represents. It is thus
hard to discern, in the work of an advocate, elements that correspond to those that in the fields both of adjudication and counseling call for the exercise of sound judgment and create room for its
display. All an advocate needs, many have concluded, is the sheer
manipulative power that Socrates had in mind when he described
rhetoric, the art of the advocate who appears before juries and
other assemblies, as a technique for making bad arguments appear
good and vice versa. An advocate must be cunning, he must know
what will persuade and what will not, he must, perhaps, have a
touch of ruthlessness and be prepared to say and do things that
under other circumstances even he would regard as reprehensible.
Where in the work of an advocate is there room for those qualities
of sympathy and detachment, and for the spirit of community
building, that I have identified with the faculty of judgment and
claim is the mark of the practically wise?
It is tempting to respond that an advocate must often act as a
counselor, for it is his job not only to champion his client's cause,
but also to help him decide, at every stage along the way, whether
to pursue some other, less combative course of action instead (by
settling a claim, for example, or pleading guilty to a reduced criminal charge).54 Here, as in the work of settlement itself, there is a
need for something more than cleverness or cunning, and a place
for practical wisdom. But this, it must be admitted, is an unsatisfying response, for it meets the charge that a successful advocate
need not be practically wise merely by pointing out that lawyers
rarely act in this capacity alone. This may be true-I happen to
believe it is-but what of advocacy itself, considered independently of the other functions lawyers perform? Can it in any sense
be said to require genuine wisdom as distinguished from slickness
and a talent for manipulation?
It is possible, I think, to construct an affirmative answer to
this question if one begins by taking seriously a puzzling remark
that Aristotle makes in his treatise on rhetoric. According to Aristotle, the persuasiveness of a speech depends, among other things,
on "the personal character of the speaker." "We believe good men
more fully and readily than others," he observes, and notes that
53 See Plato, Gorgias *455.
See, for example, Andrew McThenia and Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94
Yale L. J. 1660 (1985).
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"this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true
where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided."
Thus "[i]t is not true," Aristotle concludes, "that the personal
goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power
of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called
the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.""
This last observation, which seems flatly inconsistent with the
Socratic portrait of the successful rhetorician as a person of unscrupulous cunning, states a truth of great importance. Among the
people with whom we live and work, some we recognize as having
greater probity, prudence, and compassion than others, and we
tend instinctively to give their opinions greater weight than we
give to the views of those who lack these qualities. If a person
widely respected for sound judgment recommends that we pursue
a particular course of action, or takes a position in an institutional
debate, we treat his or her advice with special seriousness just because it comes from the person it does, regardless of its content. In
this sense, our assessment of a person's opinions is always, in part
at least, a function of our assessment of the person himself,
though, of course, other considerations enter in as well. All moral
and political argument is, to this extent, irreducibly ad hominem,
from which it follows that anyone wishing to be effective in debate
will have an interest in becoming the sort of person whose opinions
are respected, that is to say, a person of good judgment.
To this it might be objected that all anyone really needs in
order to be successful in debate is a reputation for practical wisdom and not the trait itself. 6 But a person's character is more difficult to conceal than this cynical advice implies. Our characters
reveal themselves in all we do and are open to view, on the public
surface of our lives, for everyone to see. Indeed, a person's character is often the first thing we feel with any confidence that we
know about him. The reason is that our characters (unlike our beliefs and intentions, which are more easily concealed) have a dispositional dimension-more exactly, they consist in a set of dispositions or habitual desires. What we desire is generally harder to
hide than what we think or intend, and the most difficult desires to
conceal are those that have congealed into habits. The character a
person possesses constitutes his habit of living, and though he may
be intermittently successful in keeping it from view, it is likely to

Aristotle, Rhetoric *1356a.
This is the argument that Glaucon makes in order to force Socrates to give a more
persuasive account of why justice is an intrinsic good. See Plato, Republic *360d-361d.
"
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show through in most of what he does. Living out of character for
any period of time is like living out of one's own skin, and about as
difficult. One who seeks a reputation for practical wisdom without
its substance is therefore likely to be seen for what he really is-a
puppeteer dissembling to the world, the kind of person whose
opinions we are unlikely to accept with trust or confidence.
But surely, it will be objected, none of this has any bearing on
advocacy in law. The legal advocate typically argues his case before
strangers who are unacquainted with his character and who have
neither the time nor opportunity to learn much, if anything, about
it. Moreover, though a person's character may reveal itself quickly
in informal settings, the ceremonies of the law tend to conceal
rather than accentuate the individual traits of those involved by
57
requiring them to play already scripted parts.
To this, I would reply as follows. One of the main responsibilities of a judge is to preserve the community of law, to discover and
articulate the conditions under which political fraternity is possible. It is the judge's direct responsibility to do this; he must attend
to the community of law, to its construction and preservation, and
cannot simply assume that it will come into existence as the indirect consequence of what he does by means of an invisible mechanism of coordination. We are used to thinking of the advocate's
role as a different one: the advocate's attention is directed to his
client's welfare, and if his efforts promote the community of law
they do so in a roundabout way by helping to ensure the effective
operation of our adversarial system of adjudication. It is a commonplace, however, that to be successful in the representation of
his client, a lawyer must imaginatively place himself in the position of the judge who will decide his case. (He must do this even in
a jury trial, for it is a judge who will ultimately decide the controversy on appeal). If he cannot place himself in the judge's position
and see the case from his perspective, an advocate will necessarily
be limited in his ability to predict which of the arguments he
might make on his client's behalf are most likely to meet with judicial favor, and thus be less effective in representing the client than
he otherwise would be.
To be a good advocate, then, one must be in the habit of looking at one's own case from a judicial point of view, and since a
judge's direct concern is with the community of law, an advocate
who sees things from the judge's perspective and attends to his
07 I borrow the idea of the law's ceremonial aspects from Thurman Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 211-17 (1937).
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concerns will be careful to frame his own arguments so as to emphasize the congruence between his client's interests and the interests of the legal community as a whole. Every good judge knows
the difference between a wise argument and a merely clever one. A
clever argument shows inventiveness in the way it uses legal and
other materials to promote a client's cause. A wise argument establishes a convergence between that cause and the community of law,
the community the law both expresses and sustains and whose existence it is the special obligation of judges to protect. In the cases
they decide, judges are likely to give arguments of the latter sort a
special weight, for these are made from their own perspective and
address the issue that is of paramount importance from a judicial
point of view. Wise arguments, in short, win cases, and if you are
an advocate, the only way to ensure that your arguments exhibit
wisdom with any regularity is to acquire the habit of looking at
your client's case from the point of view of a judge whose job it is
to superintend the legal system as a whole.
If it is objected that an advocate can acquire a habit of this
sort without, at the same time, acquiring the character trait I call
good judgment-that he or she can become a connoisseur of judicial attitudes and perceptions without becoming judicious-my response is that this entirely ignores the dispositional aspect of adjudication and of judgment generally. In order to know what a judge
is likely to say in any particular case, the advocate who imaginatively assumes his position must survey the conflicting interests
that the case presents with the same sympathetic detachment the
judge himself exercises. This is the only way an advocate can gain
the insight on which the judge relies and hence the only way in
which he can predict what the judge's decision in the case will be.
But it is difficult to do this-indeed, I think it is impossible-without sharing in the affective dispositions that the judge's
attitude of sympathetic detachment itself entails. And where such
sharing becomes habitual, it, in turn, is likely over time to awaken
in the advocate who imaginatively plays the role of judge a measure of the same desire for political fraternity that motivates the
judge himself. Some of the judge's own good judgment will tend, in
this way, to rub off on the advocate who is constantly straining to
see his client's case from the judge's point of view. If he succeeds
in doing so, it is likely that the advocate will eventually come to
share the judge's dispositions, to care about what the judge cares
about, and once these dispositions have become settled traits of
character, to show the same good judgment that the successful
judge displays.
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In the beginning, of course, a lawyer may have only instrumental reasons for making the effort to see his clients' cases from a
judicial point of view. Once he has acquired the capacity to do so,
however, its exercise is likely to be, for him, a source of independent satisfaction. The same is true of many skills-of the skill, for
example, of driving an automobile, or swimming, or even the mundane art of dressing properly. Initially, a person may wish to learn
these things only for the sake of some external reward, like physical safety or parental approval, but in time he often grows to value
them for their intrinsic interest and the pleasure they afford.
Where the skill in question requires the controlled employment of
certain affective attitudes-as the advocate's skill of predicting
how a judge will view his case does-this general tendency for external goods to be supplemented by internal ones is likely to be
particularly pronounced, for here the acquisition of the skill will
typically be marked by a change of character, and this is something that can never be of merely instrumental importance to the
person undergoing it.
It is only when an advocate has acquired the character trait of
good judgment that he can be confident in his ability to see the
world of legal disputes as a judge would see it and hence to distinguish wise arguments from merely clever ones. Advocates who do
not possess this trait of character may be knowledgeable about the
law and quick in argument, but their lack of judgment is a liability:
it makes them less effective than they otherwise would be. In this
sense we may with justification say that a successful advocate owes
his triumphs, in part at least, to the character he possesses, to the
fact that he is a person of a certain sort and not merely to his
knowledge of the law or mastery of rhetorical techniques. To this
extent, the truth of Aristotle's observation holds even here, in the
realm of legal advocacy, where the occasions for displaying one's
character are briefer and more ceremonial than in other areas of
life.
I have now said enough about each of the three main branches
of work in which lawyers are engaged-judging, counseling, and
advocacy-to have made credible my claim that good judgment is
indispensable in each. It is impossible, I believe, to be an outstanding lawyer in any of these fields if one lacks good judgment, and
the sorts of tasks that lawyers perform tend in turn to cultivate
this capacity by requiring its regular exercise. I do not mean to
imply that all lawyers possess good judgment-many don't, of
course-or even to suggest that a minimally acceptable competence is unattainable without it. It may be the case, for example,
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that a person's character is so decisively formed in a certain way
by the time he comes to the law that no length of living in it can
give him the traits of character I have just described. But none of
this alters the basic fact that good judgment is for lawyers a professional ideal, a virtue that gives meaning and dignity to their
craft precisely because the craft itself cannot be practiced well
58
without it.
CONCLUSION

To the question, then, of why one would ever choose to spend
a lifetime in the law the following answer might be given. To live
in the law, rather than off it, 59 is to submit to its discipline and to
accept its ideals. Among these ideals is the attainment and exercise
of good judgment or practical wisdom. To possess good judgment,
however, is not merely to possess great learning or intelligence, but
to be a person of a certain sort, to have a certain character, as well.
It follows that to aim at practical wisdom can never simply be to
aim at the appropriation of a skill whose mastery leaves its possessor fundamentally unchanged. To aim at practical wisdom is to
aim at a particular conception of character and at the way of life
associated with it. To the extent one's aim is true the result is
:' Though I have said nothing in this section about the teaching branch of the profession, the message of my article is directed to teachers as well as practicioners of law. Indeed,
in a sense, it is directed particularly to teachers, for one of the most striking characteristics
of our leading law schools today is the attitude of contempt that prevails in them toward the
old-fashioned virtue of practical wisdom. Why this should be so is a long and complicated
story. One thing, however, is clear. The mistrust of practical wisdom and of argumerts appealing to it, which is symptomatic of so much of contemporary legal scholarship, has led to
a new and disturbing division within the profession as a whole, between the practicing bar
and the professorate.
There will, of course, always be a separation of sorts between those who choose an academic career in law and those who practice their craft in some more worldly setting. In this
country, such a separation has existed for at least a century, since legal education began to
assume an academic character. In recent years, however, the separation has widened considerably. Most practicing lawyers still believe that excellence in the practice of law requires
prudence or sound judgment, a view shared by those law teachers whose primary identification continues to be with the practicing bar. Many law teachers, however (including some of
the most widely read and well-respected ones) take a different and more disparaging view of
these qualities. In their view, an insistence on the importance of practical wisdom is to be
regarded either as an ideological ploy or as a sign of scientific naivete. To be sure, practicing
lawyers and law teachers inevitably will have different interests and aims. This difference in
outlook becomes troubling, however, when it is accompanied by a loss of respect on the one
side for the qualities of mind and temperament whose possession is regarded by those on
the other as a badge of professional pride.
". See Weber, Politics as a Vocation in Gerth and Mills, eds., From Max Weber at 84
(cited in note 12) (distinguishing those who live "for" politics from those who live "off" it).
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likely to be what Socrates in the Republic describes as a turning
about of the soul, a transformation of one's own self, the development of a professional persona. Unlike some,60 I do not regard this
as a cause for regret or fear. Instead I see it as a source of pride,
for the character that lawyers achieve if they live up to their professional ideals is itself an accomplishment of value marked by the
attainment of a central human excellence.
There are, of course, other quite different modes of character
and ways of life that are appealing too. I do not mean to suggest-what would in any case be absurdly presumptuous-that the
life of a practicing lawyer is the best life anyone could lead. It is,
however, one of the lives worth leading, and the virtue of practical
wisdom that it holds up as an ideal is one of a small number of
character traits to whose cultivation a person may reasonably
devote the whole of his professional existence. A life lived in the
law in this sense has intrinsic worth for the person living it. He
need not look beyond his work to discover its point or find a reason
for continuing, but finds reason enough in the work itself, and in
the excellences he needs to do it well. Every defense of law practice
that locates its good in something extrinsic to it follows a different
strategy of argument and one, I think, that is bound to be less
satisfying.
I have now answered the question with which I began. There
is one last thought that I wish to add, however, a thought that
haunts me as I think it must haunt anyone who is attracted to the
view of law practice that I have defended here.
The world into which we have been born and in which it is our
common fate to live is a world characterized, above all else, by
what Max Weber called the process of rationalization." In the
countries of Western Europe and North America, every department of life-and this is as true of painting and poetry as it is of
government and economic enterprise-has in the last century been
rationalized or intellectualized to a degree unimaginable even to
those Enlightenment thinkers who prepared the foundations for
this development and acted as its early champions. Everywhere,
even in areas of life where the intellect has always played at most a
minor role, the claims of reason today enjoy a commanding priority
over all others. By "claims of reason" I mean two things: first, a
demand for intellectual transparency and second, for calculability.
60See, for example, Eshete, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter? (cited in note 20).
61 Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in Gerth and Mills, eds., From Max Weber at
155-56 (cited in note 12).
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Only those activities and institutions that are based upon rules
and processes that are fully accessible to the light of reason and
that provide a framework for action calculable to the highest possible degree are rational in this twofold sense. All others are irrational, which today means either unworthy or in need of repair.
Historically speaking, this is a novel idea though for us, as I have
said, it is a fateful fact. The rationalization process that today carries our civilization forward has been gaining momentum for centuries, and like a powerful current it now sweeps us all along to a
common destiny.
The law is as much caught in this current as everything else.
Indeed, the law seems at times to be an accelerating force and has
certainly supplied, out of its own particular resources, many of the
2
main ideas that underlie the rationalization process as a whole.

There is much in our Anglo-American system of law, however, that
is bound to seem anachronistic or even objectionable when viewed
from the perspective of the claims of reason, and so to the extent
these claims are taken seriously, there will be recurrent, and perhaps ultimately irresistible, demands that these irrational elements
be purged. Among these elements, I am afraid, many will include
the old-fashioned virtue of practical wisdom. Can practical wisdom
remain a professional ideal in a legal world that has internalized
the claims of reason?
There is, so far, only inconclusive evidence but it all points in
the same direction-towards the transformation of legal education
into a branch of social scientific training, 3 of the judiciary into a
managerial bureaucracy," and of the private law firm into a rationalized, profitmaking enterprise indistinguishable from any other
economic organization. 5 These developments reflect, I believe, a
common tendency toward increased rationalization in every branch

of our profession, and the consequence has in each case been a
weakening of the ideal of practical wisdom as a guiding professional norm. I do not know whether this tendency has a natural
62 See Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 72-95 (1983).
"3 See John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Teaching Social Science in Law:. An Alternative to "Law and Society," 35 J. Legal Educ. 478 (1985) (noting meteoric rise of social
science teaching in the law schools from mid-1970s to today).
" See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 102-19 (1985); Owen
Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L. J. 1442 (1983); Wade H. McCree,
Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 777 (1981).
6" See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985) (analyzing law firm as profit-making organization).
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limit, or whether it can be deliberately reversed if we make the
effort, although I am inclined to think the answer to both questions is no. Beyond a certain point-and this is the thought that
haunts me-the rationalization of the law is likely to turn us all,
those who teach the law as well as those who make and practice it,
into bureaucratic functionaries, characterless experts whose work
requires knowledge, precision, and fairness, but never judgment in
the sense that I have used that term here. When this happens, the
only goods remaining to those who practice law will be external
goods. Will it be possible, in the world of law that I fear is growing
up around us, to answer someone who asks why he should choose a
living in the law or think of it as anything more than a way of
passing time and making money?

